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Character education and the ‘priority of recognition’ 
By Agnieszka Bates 
As part of a revival of interest in character education, English schools are required 
to teach the new ‘three Rs’: resilience, respect for ‘fundamental British values’ 
and responsibility for one’s own well-being. School inspectors evaluate children’s 
resilience, whilst the Department for Education has offered financial incentives to 
schools that ‘instil’ mental toughness and ‘grit’. However, this approach may prove 
counterproductive because it relies on teaching about desirable character traits and 
neglects the interpersonal relations within which ‘character’ develops. This paper 
argues for an alternative ‘fourth R’ of character education, based on Honneth’s 
theory of recognition. As an empathetic connection to others arising from their 
intrinsic worth, recognition precedes cognition and a detached, neutral stance. 
Recognition of others as a prerequisite for moral action provides a foundation for 
an approach to character education that takes account of intersubjective 
relationships in schools and the wider social context within which character is 
shaped. 
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Introduction: ‘producing’ character in character education 
Educational concern with the formation of character in children is a feature of modern 
social history in many international contexts, driven by diverse political, social and 
economic objectives. In nineteenth century Victorian Britain for example, elite ‘public’ 
schools focused on the development of character through team games and physical 
activity with the aim of instilling discipline and leadership qualities (Dishon, 2017). For 
the masses, Victorian ‘moral training’ schools whilst teaching the three ‘Rs’ (‘reading’, 
‘writing’ and ‘arithmetic’) also paid attention to close personal relationships between 
teachers and children, in order to access and improve the ‘child’s interiority’ (Allen, 2013, 
p. 237). In early twentieth century USA, schooling was expected to contribute to nation 
building, in the belief that it is more effective to ‘instruct the young’ than ‘coerce the 
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adult’ (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p. 2). Since the 1970s, in line with Kohlberg’s theory of 
moral development, teaching has been seen by many educators as an ‘intrinsically moral 
enterprise’ concerned with children’s moral development and welfare (Arthur et al., 2017, 
p. 1; Kohlberg, 1981). The current revival of interest in character education has been 
premised on the notion of ‘producing’ desirable character traits in order to improve 
national economic competitiveness and increase social mobility. For example, the 
Department for Education (DfE, 2014a) discourse of ‘excellent teachers’ who ‘produce 
well-rounded pupils’, displaying resilience, self-control and a strong work ethic, 
resonates with the renewed crisis of low national productivity. Desirable character traits 
are viewed as means to instrumental ends: they support ‘improved academic attainment’, 
are ‘valued by employers’ and ‘enable children to make a positive contribution to British 
society’ (DfE, 2017). To boost schools’ focus on what could be termed the new ‘three 
Rs’ of education: resilience, respect and responsibility, the DfE has offered Character 
Education Awards, as financial incentives for schools to engage in initiatives such as talks 
by motivational speakers, ‘passports’ to improve character, records of ‘personal 
excellence’, and rewards to motivate children to develop their ‘ideal selves’ (DfE, 2015, 
2016b). A significant increase in government funding for character education has also 
been observed in the USA. For example, Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush tripled 
funding for character education, raising the total spent each year to the level of billions 
of dollars (Watz, 2011).  
Of the ‘three Rs’ of character education, resilience is receiving the most 
prominence in England and school (Ofsted) inspectors now look for resilience in the 
classroom and the staffroom. A review of Ofsted inspection reports published on the 
Ofsted website since 2016, suggests that in a classroom rated as ‘outstanding’ or ‘good’, 
children show ‘resilience in concentrating on work they are asked to complete 
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independently’, or ‘resilience to finish more challenging books’ (Ofsted, 2016).[1] 
Conversely, in an ‘inadequate’ school, inspectors find that: ‘pupils are not resilient 
learners. This is especially so for many White British boys’ (ibid.). Where school 
leadership is judged as ‘outstanding’, the headteacher pursues ‘the highest quality of 
education for pupils tirelessly and resiliently’, with resilience infusing the entire ethos of 
the school: ‘Staff model these values exceptionally well and, consequently, pupils are 
resilient, well considered and mature’ (ibid.).  
These approaches to character education can be traced back to developments that 
have achieved a global spread in recent years: ‘Positive Psychology’ (PP, Seligman, 2002; 
Seligman et al., 2009); theories of emotional intelligence (EI, Goleman, 1998) and the 
‘growth mindset’ (Dweck, 2006).[2]  The issue of productivity, both in the classroom and 
the staffroom, is linked here to improving motivation, developing ‘aspirational’ cultures 
and utilising techniques for the regulation of negative emotions. An assumption taken for 
granted in PP is that psychological well-being can be developed by teaching ‘PERMA’: 
‘Positive Emotions’; ‘Engagement’; ‘Relationships’; ‘Meaning’ and ‘Accomplishments’ 
(Seligman et al., 2009, p. 209). Appeals to ‘positive’ values are made to reinforce the 
production of desirable character traits, through ‘habit instruction’ (Goodman, 2018). For 
example: ‘Staff remind pupils of the school’s values such as ‘resilience’ and 
‘responsibility’ throughout the day. Few opportunities are wasted to strengthen pupils’ 
positive attitudes’ (Ofsted, 2016).   
However useful such approaches may be in teaching about character, they have 
been criticised for: recasting moral values as psychological constructs that can be 
measured and inculcated without requiring moral engagement (Ecclestone, 2012); 
assuming that desirable character traits can be instilled in children by mimicking desirable 
adult behaviours (Bates, 2017); encouraging a deficit view of the individual (Ecclestone 
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& Hayes 2009) and normalising a particular ideal of a ‘perfect’ self (Cigman, 2012). The 
idea of ‘producing’ certain types of children conjures up industrial images of schools as 
factories or assembly lines rather than environments in which children’s moral 
development can be nurtured (Carr, 2012). Importantly, such approaches encourage 
students to be self-absorbed and, by elevating positive, performance-oriented emotional 
states to moral virtues, they neglect more holistic, philosophical understandings of our 
human needs and moral standpoints (Smeyers et al., 2010).  
Where informed by philosophical antecedents, character education in England 
draws mainly on Aristotelian virtue ethics, promoted by the Jubilee Centre for Character 
and Virtues (Arthur et al., 2015, 2017; Carr et al., 2017). The Jubilee Centre goes beyond 
the ‘three Rs’ of character education by positing that ‘good’ character embraces: moral 
virtues (such as honesty and kindness); civic virtues (community service); intellectual 
virtues (curiosity, creativity) and performance virtues (diligence and perseverance). To 
overcome the self-centeredness of psychological approaches, Jubilee Centre scholars 
promote character education that aims at enhancing students’ sensitivity to others, an 
ability to identify morally bad choices and the capability to reason about the justifications 
of their own actions (Arthur et al., 2015). Aristotelian virtue education thus transcends 
approaches that are either ‘under-theorised’, or theorised within frameworks which lack 
‘a moral compass’ (Kristjánsson, 2016, p. 528). As Kristjánsson (2015) put it: 
 
To be sure, resilience helps us bounce back from negative experiences and self-
confidence makes us more efficacious in achieving our ends. The deeper worry is, 
though, that those ‘virtues’ can be positively dangerous if they are untethered from 
moral constraints. The missing element in the character make-up of the ‘banksters’ 
in the run-up to the financial crisis… is clearly not a higher level of resilience and 




As illustrated above by the Ofsted reference to staff reminding pupils ‘of the school’s 
values such as ‘resilience’ and ‘responsibility’ throughout the day’, ‘under-theorised’ 
approaches may lead to practices for ‘habit instruction’ (Goodman, 2018) that normalise 
a lack of deeper moral consideration. To avoid such practices, the resources for 
developing ‘virtuous’ character, offered by the Jubilee Centre (2015) to teachers and 
researchers in the UK and internationally, are embedded within the neo-Aristotelian 
perspective. However, the Jubilee Centre’s (2017, p. 2) definition of ‘character’ as a ‘set 
of personal traits or dispositions that produce specific moral emotions, inform motivation 
and guide conduct’ may foster a focus on the individual rather than individuals - in-
relation, acting in specific socio-political and economic contexts.  
This paper seeks to contribute to character education by focusing on the hitherto 
neglected, albeit essential ‘fourth R’ of character education, recognition. It proposes a 
dynamic definition of character as a ‘capacity to engage the larger world’, pertaining to 
relational aspects of personality (Sennett,  2003, p. 63) and underpinned by the 
intersubjective view of the self (Honneth, 1995). To explain the importance of recognition 
in interpersonal relations in the classroom, the school and beyond the school walls, I draw 
on Honneth’s (1995, 2006) theory of recognition. Honneth’s work on recognition 
provides a synthesis of Hegel’s (1802/3) early writings on recognition, Mead’s (1956) 
social psychology and Winnicott’s (1965) psychoanalytic theory of child development. 
True to its Hegelian roots, Honneth’s account supports an engagement with moral 
questions that give rise to the struggle for recognition.[3]  It also posits important political 
questions that have been ‘written out’ (Suissa 2015, p. 111) of programmes for character 
and citizenship education (Jerome, 2015; Weinberg and Flinders, 2018). This paper now 
proceeds to consider the ‘priority of recognition’ and how character is shaped through 
relations of recognition (or disrespect) in the family, the community, the state and the 
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public realm. A discussion of the global politics of recognition follows, shedding light on 
some of the limitations of Honneth’s theory. Educational implications of a ‘recognition-
theoretical’ (Honneth, 2006) view of character conclude the paper. 
 
The ‘priority of recognition’  
Honneth (1995, 2006) starts from a premise that individuals are not autonomous but 
mutually dependent and, therefore, our identity develops through interpersonal 
(intersubjective) relationships. Due to mutual dependence, our daily interactions are not 
‘characterized by a self-centred, egocentric stance but by the effort to involve ourselves 
with given circumstances in the most frictionless, harmonious way possible’ (2006, p. 
111). In our everyday encounters, recognition involves: 
 
empathetic engagement in the world, arising from the experience of the world’s 
significance and value... [which] is prior to our acts of detached cognition. A 
recognitional stance therefore embodies our active and constant assessment of the 
value that persons or things have in themselves. (p. 111) 
 
The ‘priority of recognition’ means, firstly, that recognition precedes cognition 
ontogenetically and secondly, that the psychological development of the individual is 
rooted in social interactions based on inherent significance and value that people and 
things ‘have in themselves’.  
Regarding the first element of Honneth’s explanation of the ‘priority of 
recognition’, ontologically, recognition comes before cognition or, in other words, our 
‘empathetic engagement precedes a neutral grasping of reality’ (2006, p. 113). In my 
everyday encounters, I am empathetically oriented to others and the world, before the 
cognitive, neutral grasping of reality comes to the fore and before instrumental reason 
orients me to people and things in the world as means to my ends. It is important to note 
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that this is an ‘ontological’ argument for the priority of recognition in the sense of what 
is, rather than what ought to be. In other words, a thesis that an empathetic engagement 
is ‘prior’ to neutral acts of cognition is not to be understood as an idealisation of empathy 
as a value to espouse, but as a proposition that acts of recognition precede cognition. This 
account offers entirely different meanings of recognition and empathetic engagement to 
those developed within EI and PP. For example, the model of Emotional Intelligence also 
features ‘recognition’. ‘Recognition’ is, however, framed by Goleman et al. (2002) as acts 
of detached cognition (involving ‘self-awareness’, ‘self-confidence’ and ‘accurate self-
assessment’) that are instrumentally deployed for improving work performance. A similar 
‘rationalisation’ of empathy is revealed in the definition of empathy as a cognitive ‘ability 
to know how another feels’ [my emphasis] (Goleman, 1995, p. 96). In the ‘PERMA’ 
model of Positive Psychology, the meaning of empathetic engagement resides in 
‘knowing what your highest strengths are, and then using them to belong to and to serve 
something you believe is larger than the self’ [my emphasis] (Seligman et al. 2009: 209). 
By contrast, Honneth’s account points to the vulnerability at the root of our compassion 
for others. This vulnerability is predicated on our inherently social nature rather than 
knowing and using our ‘highest strengths’ as self-defining, self-sufficient individuals.  
This links to the second element in Honneth’s argument for the ‘priority of 
recognition’, namely an intersubjective account of identity as it develops within and 
through social interactions. Honneth works here with Mead’s (1956) social theory and 
Winnicott’s (1965) account of psycho-social development in early childhood to show 
that:  
 
The progress that the child’s development must make if it is  to lead to a 
psychologically healthy personality is read off changes in the structure of a system 
in interactions and not off transformation in the organization of individual drive 
potential. (Honneth, 1995, p. 99) 
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The way human life begins and unfolds in early childhood enhances a child’s sense of 
interdependence and the need for mutual relations in which others are respected and loved 
for their own sake. Winnicott (1965) demonstrated that an infant’s and young child’s 
positive relation-to-self (basic self-confidence) arises from being cared for and free from 
the fear of being abandoned. Taking this further, Honneth posits that infancy and early 
childhood are a stage when the first mode of recognition, termed ‘emotional support’, is 
of crucial importance for psychologically and socially healthy development. The basic 
self-confidence that arises in intersubjective relations of ‘emotional support’, involves 
being able to express one’s needs and feelings and constitutes a ‘precondition for the 
development of all further attitudes of self-respect’ (Honneth, 1995, p. 107).  
Whilst caring relationships between the infant and the mother and other primary 
carers provide the conditions for the development of a child’s basic self-confidence, 
conversely, physical neglect or abuse threaten both the basic self-confidence and physical 
integrity of the individual. Because basic self-confidence originates in infancy and early 
childhood, the crucial primary relationships will have run much of their course by the 
time children begin school. This does not mean, however, that the presence or absence of 
basic self-confidence may be taken for granted, or that the absence of basic self-
confidence can be ‘regulated’ through Positive Psychology techniques or lessons in 
resilience and ‘grit’. As explained by Winnicott (1965), good parenting is about 
remembering that children are vulnerable and the same principle should underpin the 
work of educators in the loco parentis role. Offering emotional support to young children 
unfolds through pedagogical relations that allow children to have needs, to be insufficient 
and vulnerable rather than ‘tough’ (Nussbaum, 2001).   
The intersubjective view of development thus questions the Positive Psychology 
view of the individual as independent, self-sufficient and self-grounding. PP does not 
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allow for human weakness and vulnerability, leading to a one-sided approach, whereby 
one may gain recognition for one’s strengths or achievements but remain misrecognised 
(disrespected) because of one’s weaknesses. Goodman (2018, p. 10) notes that words 
such as ‘morality’ and ‘virtue’ recur in Seligman’s work but his proposed desirable 
character traits are so ‘psychologized that they could readily fall into character-without-
virtue’ model of character education that elevates humour, spontaneity, compliant 
behaviour and other  positive personality traits to moral virtues. The formula for character 
education in the most recent schools’ white paper follows this one-sided approach, 
whereby a recognition of children’s needs has been replaced with the new ‘three Rs’, 
resilience, respect for ‘fundamental’ British values and responsibility for one’s own 
success and well-being:  
 
A 21st century education should prepare children for adult life by instilling the 
character traits and fundamental British values that will help them succeed: being 
resilient and knowing how to persevere, how to bounce back if faced with failure, 
and how to collaborate with others at work and in their private lives. These traits not 
only open doors to employment and social opportunities but underpin academic 
success, happiness and wellbeing. (DfE, 2016a, pp. 94-95) [4] 
 
What has been ‘written out’ of the above blueprint for the 21st century education, is not 
just the essential human need of recognition, but also the public realm. The notable 
absence of the public realm is clear in the reference to collaboration with others, ‘at work’ 
and in ‘private lives’. If we define ‘the political’ as the ‘whole realm of human enquiry 
and experience that touches on the question of ‘how people like us are to live together’’ 
(Suissa, 2015, p. 110), then the ‘disappearance of the political’ comes to the fore, both in 
education policy and teaching resources. In citizenship education, the tendency to favour 
an individualised account of the ‘good citizen’ (Crick, 2000) has intensified since 2010. 
The post-2010 character agenda has been replacing a focus on ‘collective, active (and 
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justice oriented) citizenship’, enacted in the public realm, with ‘volunteering, grit and 
resilience’ (Weinberg and Flinders, 2018, p. 577). The rare appearances of the word 
‘political’ in statements connecting character education to citizenship are typically used 
in the context of ‘political participation’: 
  
as if what is important is that children be prepared for participating in something 
already defined as the political system; not that they engage in meaningful thought 
and discussion about just what such a system is, what it should be, what participation 
in it consists in or why it may be valuable. (Suissa, 2015, p. 110) 
  
Suissa argues that bringing the political back to character education entails supporting 
students in understanding that the political realm involves moral debates about human 
needs and social obligations related to these needs, as well as the question: ‘Are there 
some things we shouldn’t be resilient to?’ (2015, p. 111). As explained below, Honneth’s 
investigation of this question focuses on modes of misrecognition (disrespect) that give 
rise to morally justifiable struggles for recognition. This is because recognition and 
disrespect not only respectively enhance or challenge one’s sense of identity, but also 
provide a moral foundation for harmonious or conflictual relations in the public realm. 
 
Recognition and disrespect 
Honneth’s (1995) theory of recognition makes a distinction between three modes of 
recognition: emotional support, cognitive respect, and social esteem. These three modes 
provide the basis for the corresponding development of: basic self-confidence 
(corresponding to emotional support), self-esteem (corresponding to social esteem) and 
self-respect (corresponding to cognitive respect). As explained in the discussion of 
infancy and early childhood above, these qualities are intersubjectively acquired through 
the recognition of others. Conversely, a lack of recognition, disrespect and denigration 
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of ways of life ‘injure or even destroy’ a person’s relation-to-self (1995, p. 94), providing 
moral grounds for a struggle for recognition.[5]  
Developed in childhood as well as in later life, and predicated on recognition 
found in ‘communities of value’ (p. 111) is self-esteem. Self-esteem is linked to the social 
‘worth’ of the individual, to his/her individual traits, abilities and achievements whose 
value ‘can be measured according to criteria of social relevance’ (p. 111). The 
development of self-esteem arises from intersubjective experiences which occur both 
during and beyond the school years and are based on being recognised as a person, a 
‘being possessed of personal qualities’ (p. 112). Recognising a child as a person does not 
involve ‘the empirical application of general, intuitively known norms but rather the 
graduated appraisal of concrete traits and abilities’ (p. 113). This mode of recognition is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to realise in an education system which has 
established a normative view of the ‘exemplary pupil’ as one who displays ‘resilience, 
self-control, humour, charity and a strong work ethic’ (Morgan, 2014). This system 
prioritises cognition over recognition, replacing empathetic pedagogical relations with 
technicist activities such as setting ‘aspirational’ targets and ‘objective’ calculation of 
children’s progress through regular assessment tasks. These technicist activities 
encourage a tendency to perceive children as ‘mere insensate objects’ (Honneth, 2006, p. 
129) rather than individuals respected for their unique personal traits and abilities:  
 
in this kind of amnesia we lose the ability to understand immediately the behavioral 
expressions of other persons as making claims on us—as demanding that we react in 
an appropriate way. We may indeed be capable in a cognitive sense of perceiving 
the full spectrum of human expressions, but we lack, so to speak, the feeling of 
connection that would be necessary for us to be affected by the expressions we 
perceive. (p. 129) 
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On Honneth’s analysis, character education that seeks to ‘produce’ pupils who fit into the 
mold of the standardised exemplary character, with little or no respect for the person, is 
a manifestation of a perceptive objectification (‘reification’) of pupils reminiscent of 
autism:  
 
forgetting our antecedent recognition... corresponds to the result produced by a 
perceptive reification of the world. In other words, our social surroundings appear 
here, very much as in the autistic child’s world of perception, as a totality of merely 
observable objects lacking all psychic impulse or emotion. (p. 129) 
 
In prioritising top performance, education envisaged as a solution to a perceived national 
crisis in productivity or economic weakness fosters a tendency to forget the essential need 
of children and young people to be valued as persons possessed of unique traits and 
capabilities. 
But character education that goes beyond teaching about character needs to also 
consider the wider social context and include the public realm that has been ‘written out’ 
of the schools’ white paper (DfE, 2016a). Schools do not operate in a vacuum and 
‘character’ or, to use Honneth’s (1995) term, ‘identity’ is shaped within intersubjective 
relations throughout lifetime. In the public realm, deeper political processes have been at 
play that may undermine the self-esteem of those involved in education through 
articulations of disrespect. The discourses of ‘derision’ (Ball, 1990) levelled at teachers 
may undermine both the self-esteem of teachers and the social esteem that teachers need 
in order to be recognised, not just for their contribution to the education of children, but 
for their intrinsic worth as a community of value. For example, the former Education 
Secretary Michael Gove’s (2012) references to teachers as the ‘enemies of promise’ and 
‘the blob’ (Garner, 2014) undermined the dignity of the teaching profession. Disrespect 
has also been levelled at the lowest achieving 20 percent of pupils in England, objectified 
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as the ‘underperforming educational tail’ (Paterson, 2013, p. 11). The Ofsted (2016) 
statement above referring to the ‘many White British boys’ lacking in resilience resonates 
with the discourse associating white working-class boys and their parents with the 
‘cultural blight of low expectations’ (Marshall, 2013, p. 13). These discourses undermine 
the very social contexts in which character develops: the family home, the school and the 
local community. As Honneth (1995, p. 134) notes, downgrading particular forms of 
social life as inferior or deficient is a type of disrespect that ‘robs’ individuals of self-
esteem as well as the ability to ‘relate to their mode of life as something of positive 
significance within their community’. Although it is impossible to completely eliminate 
the hierarchy of values and cultural conflicts in which different social groups seek to raise 
the values associated with their own way of life, avoiding the denigration of the ways of 
life esteemed by the diverse groups comprising modern society may go some way towards 
maintaining more harmonious social relations. Avoiding the negative stereotyping of 
diverse groups may thus provide the social context in which children and young people’s 
respect for the ‘fundamental British value’ of mutual respect and tolerance of those with 
different faiths and beliefs (DfE, 2014b) would develop. 
The third mode of recognition proposed by Honneth (1995) pertains to cognitive 
respect, which is realised in the public realm through the recognition of legal relations 
and rights. Inclusive legal rights (and obligations) enhance the development of self-
respect and moral responsibility. Conversely, ‘structural exclusion’ from the possession 
of certain rights within society deprives individuals of the experience of enjoying a ‘status 
of a fully-fledged partner to interaction, equally endowed with moral rights’ (1995, p. 
133). The 2010 Parliament vote for the tripling of tuition fees can be cited as an example 
of the ‘structural exclusion’ that deprived young people in England of the right to free 
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education enjoyed by their parents’ generation. This denial of the right to free university 
education, despite student protests, may be considered as equivalent to:  
 
a violation of the intersubjective expectation to be recognized as a subject capable 
of forming moral judgement. (…) the experience of this type of disrespect typically 
brings with it a loss of self-respect, or the ability to relate to oneself as a legally equal 
interaction partner with all fellow humans. (1995, pp. 133-4)   
 
This form of disrespect may both discourage young people from ‘political participation’ 
(Suissa, 2015) and adversely affect the development of moral responsibility that is at the 
core of character education. This situation has been exacerbated by the recent legal 
changes to the status of students as ‘consumers’ in the higher education market 
(Competition & Markets Authority, 2015). A student with a right to free university 
education has a legal status of a citizen, based on her intrinsic worth as a young person in 
a society which seeks to ensure a legally-equal interaction for all citizens. A student-
consumer may have her consumer rights protected, but at a price: in tuition fees and the 
loss of her right to free university education. The title of the white paper for higher 
education, ‘Success as a Knowledge Economy’ [my emphasis] (DBIS, 2016), provides a 
symbolic denial of the need to be treated as citizens for of all those involved in higher 
education. A Honneth reading of these structural changes highlights an increasing 
commoditisation of social relations, which not only move away from the three modes of 
recognition, but actively encourage an egocentric calculation of particular situations and 
relationships solely on the basis of their utility value in achieving one’s individualist ic 
goals. As Honneth (2006) explains: 
 
Subjects in a commodity exchange are mutually urged (a) to perceive given objects 
solely as ‘things’ that one can potentially make a profit on, (b) to regard each other 
solely as ‘objects’ of profitable transactions, and finally (c) to regard their own 
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abilities as nothing but supplemental ‘resources’ in the calculation of profit 
opportunities. (p. 97) 
 
Examples of calculative reason abound in education policy, from the vision of 21st 
century character education, valued for opening ‘doors to employment and social 
opportunities’ (DfE, 2016a, pp. 94-95), to the higher education market which protects 
student-consumer rights in transactional relations of commodity exchange, where upon 
paying a high price for access to higher education one expects ‘value for money’ in return. 
On the ‘recognition-theoretical’ view presented in this paper, social relations underpinned 
by commodity exchange are counterproductive to character education. Honneth’s theory 
explains why it may be tempting to comply with what subjects positioned in relations of 
commodity exchange are ‘urged’ to be doing. In a moment of ‘cold, calculating 
purposefulness’ (Honneth, 2006, p. 91), a busy teacher may be tempted to deliver a lesson 
in resilience, ‘tick it off’ and go on to prepare children for high-stakes tests, as an 
important measure of her own performance. A headteacher held to account for the 
persistent underachievement of the ‘same’ group of boys in his school may resign himself 
to justifying this problem in terms of a ‘cultural blight of low expectations’. A school 
awaiting an Ofsted inspection may prioritise producing evidence of resilience for 
inspectors to see over working with vulnerable children. A policymaker may engage in 
calculative thinking on seeing little choice but to follow the party line. However, 
educating ‘character’ calls for resisting these moments of ‘cold, calculating 
purposefulness’ to shape relations differently, in school and beyond.  
 
The global politics of recognition 
Honneth’s (2006) concerns about misrecognition resonate with those by other 
commentators who write about the ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor, 1992) in the wake of 
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socio-political and economic changes brought about by globalisation, neoliberalisat ion 
and the transformation of modern industrial capitalism into ‘new capitalism’ (Sennett, 
2000). The neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist state has led to the exclusion of large 
swathes of population from systems of recognition (Sennett, 2000; Butler as cited in 
Willig, 2012; Honneth, 2012). The diminution of the regulatory power of the neoliberal 
state results in diminished access to state-regulated opportunities for self-respect by 
society’s members. In the economic sphere, the deregulation and flexibilisation of labour  
means that, for many, work is no longer a reliable, contractually secure source of income 
and occupational stability. This situation has been exacerbated by growing numbers of 
people seeking legal recognition as immigrants or refugees with no legal status and state 
protection (Honneth, 2012). 
Writing in the US context, Sennett (2000) shows how instrumentalist workplace 
relations of ‘flexible labor’ combine with the use of new technologies to give rise to the 
‘dispensable self’: 
 
The result of uselessness, de-skilling, and task-labor for the American worker is the 
dispensable self. Instead of the institutionally induced boredom of the assembly line, 
this experiential deficit appears to lie within the worker - a worker who hasn’t made 
him- or herself of lasting value to others and so can simply disappear from view. (p. 
61) 
 
 At its most extreme, misrecognition is manifested in ‘new capitalism’ not just in the 
instrumental use of others but also in the ‘specter of uselessness’ which has come to haunt 
highly qualified professionals and manual workers alike (Sennett, 1998, p. 83). The pain 
of uselessness may be experienced particularly acutely by young people as they are being 
prepared in the course of their education for jobs that may become obsolete in the future. 
Sennett (1998) notes that protecting oneself from the ‘specter of uselessness’ may lead to 
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a corrosion of character. If we view good character in terms of durable aspects of the 
individual’s make-up expressed by ‘loyalty and mutual commitment, or through the 
pursuit of long-term goals, or by the practice of delayed gratification for the sake of a 
future end’, then such durable aspects may be experienced as undesirable under 
conditions of ‘disposable’ work (p. 9).  
And yet, ‘without certain substantial forms of recognition, our lives continue to 
be at risk’ (Butler as cited in Willig, 2012, pp. 140-41). A lack of recognition within social 
institutions leads to the exclusion of individuals and social groups from the ‘structures’ 
and ‘vocabularies of political representation’ (ibid.). Faced with the imperative to ensure 
inclusion of diverse social groups, many western democracies have grappled with the 
unresolvable tension between the ‘politics of equal dignity’ and the ‘politics of 
difference’:  
 
With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the 
same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, 
what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, 
their distinctness from everyone else. (Taylor, 1922, p. 38) 
 
The key implication of this tension is that ‘difference-blind’ principles may suppress 
identity by imposing a ‘false homogeneity’, under the banner of equal dignity (Taylor, 
1992, p. 44). Respect for ‘fundamental British values’ (FBV, DfE, 2016a) currently being 
promoted as pivotal to preparing pupils for life in modern Britain is an example of such 
‘difference-blind’ principles which, without a genuinely open debate and careful 
deliberation, risk generating expressions of a ‘false homogeneity’. The implicit message 
that FBV are wholly ‘British’ contradicts their stated aim of forging cohesion in 
multicultural Britain (Lander, 2016). The label ‘fundamental’ implies that FBV provide 
basic core principles or a ‘default position’ which can be used to question the loyalty, 
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belonging and status of ‘outsiders’ (Healy, 2018). From the perspective of postcolonial 
theorists, the normative power of notions such as ‘fundamental British values’ gives rise 
to ‘recognition through assimilation’ (Spivak, 1994, p. 89), i.e. the appropriation of the 
non-British ‘others’ into the allegedly superior Anglo-European ‘inside’.  
Beyond narratives of difference spun around binaries such as British/non-Brit ish, 
us/them or I/it, reside postmodern ethics of difference predicated on the priority of the 
Other (Bauman, 1993). The priority of the Other unfolds in intersubjective relations 
which are non-symmetrical, in the sense that ‘I am responsible for the Other without 
waiting for reciprocity’ (Levinas, 1985, pp. 98-99). Elaborating on the priority of the 
Other, Bauman (1993, p. 12) defines postmodern ethics as rooted in the moral impulse of 
‘being-for-the-Other’ that is often silenced by universalised ethical rules. Taking stock of 
the moral ‘blind alleys’ of modernity such as the holocaust, moral indifference and the 
dehumanisation of others, Bauman argues that: 
 
If postmodernity is a retreat from the blind alleys into which radically pursued 
ambitions of modernity have led, a postmodern ethics would be one that readmits 
the Other as a neighbour… into the hard core of the moral self, back from the 
wasteland of calculated interests to which it had been exiled… an ethics that recasts 
the Other as the crucial character in the process through which the moral self comes 
into its own. (1993, p. 84)  
 
The socio-political, economic and moral challenges underpinning the global ‘politics of 
recognition’ call for a more complex view of ‘character’ than the ‘virtuous’ or ‘positive’ 
individual that provides the basis for the models of character education discussed above 
(Arthur et al., 2015; Goleman, 1998; Seligman, 2002). These challenges also illuminate 
the limitations of Honneth’s ‘recognition-theoretical’ (1995, 2016) view of character. 
Instead of improving social relations, recognition may become ‘reduced to polite 
behaviour or etiquette’ (Huttunen and Heikkinen, 2004, p. 163). It may also provide a 
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basis for recognising others ‘through assimilation’ (Spivak, 1994). Honneth’s thesis of 
the priority of recognition has been problematised by Butler (2008) who maintains that a 
person must first become aware of himself, before he can take a view of another person.  
Despite these limitations, Honneth’ theory of recognition offers an important 
framework for understanding the foundations of character in the deep structures of our 
intersubjective experience as it unfolds in the family home, the community, the state and 
the public realm. As a critical theorist of the third generation, Honneth set out to avoid 
the second generation’s search for universal, abstract principles of morality by anchoring 
his investigations in the lived experience of relations of recognition (and disrespect). The 
result of this endeavour is a theory which also provides a framework for understanding 
social conflict and resources for its practical overcoming (Hanhela, 2014b). The focus on 
the everyday aligns Honneth with postcolonial theorists whose methodology relies on 
retrieving embodied, local experiences and theorising them from situated, partial 
perspectives that counter the positivist myth of the detached ‘vision from nowhere’ 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 581). Honneth’s critique of relations in modernity is not as radical as 
those offered by postcolonial theorists. However, just as Honneth’s reconstruction of 
Hegel’s writings on recognition was guided by a hope of following developmental paths 
as they lead ‘towards moral progress’ (Honneth, 2013, p. 38), his own thesis of the 
priority of recognition can also be taken as a path to be explored ‘more adequately and 
more fully’ in the future. It is also possible that a more adequate conceptualisation of 
character is to be found from a different starting point, pertaining to the priority of the 
Other (Levinas 1985) rather than the priority of recognition of others. It is also possible 
that both of these starting points lead towards moral progress. 
Honneth can, therefore, be regarded as one of a number of critical thinkers who 
offer theoretical tools for deepening our understanding of character, with important 
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implications for character education. What their explorations point to is that character 
education that is true to the view of ‘character’ as an individual-in-relation, acting within 
complex and increasingly precarious environments, needs to be based on a genuinely 
open debate, questioning and critique. If certain questions cannot be debated: 
 
then the very idea of ‘reality’ is being circumscribed by censoring powers… critique 
is linked both to deliberative democracy – the idea of an open and uncensored 
consideration of political values and actions… that is not regulated in advance by 
state or corporate power. (Butler as cited in Willig, 2012, p. 142) 
 
The numerous crises ‘facing us today demand radical solutions’ and participation in 
debates about such solutions and about ‘the kind of society we want’ should be an 
essential element of character education (Suissa, 2015, p. 114). Given the problems of 
inequality, poverty and austerity (Lupton et al., 2016), coupled with problems arising 
from globalisation, what children and young people need to learn to challenge, is a lack 
of recognition of their moral rights, as well as those of others.  
 
Conclusion  
The recent revival of interest in character education has generated a plethora of 
approaches and resources, ranging from materials embedded in the neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethics developed by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues to techniques for 
the regulation of negative emotions offered by Positive Psychology. Seligman’s (2002) 
Positive Psychology and Goleman’s (1998) Emotional Intelligence models focus on 
‘positive’ character traits aimed at increasing motivation and productivity. The Jubilee 
Centre embraces a broader approach, by promoting moral, civic, intellectual and 
performance virtues (Arthur et al., 2015). Policymakers’ interest in character education 
has led to the development of a very specific formula for ‘producing’ the desirable 
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character by inculcating, in the English context, the new ‘three Rs’ of education: 
resilience, respect and responsibility. This narrowing down of ‘character’ from the more 
broadly conceived virtues that, in line with neo-Aristotelian thinking, enable full human 
flourishing, to the purely instrumentalist goal of improved performance, is indicative of 
the priority of performativity in English education policy. The introduction of the 
‘fundamental British values’ of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual 
respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs  can be seen as an attempt 
to regain social cohesion, lost as a result of an increasing individualisation of social 
relations and other problems characteristic of ‘new capitalism’.   
However, without political debate, questioning and critique of the socio-polit ical 
and economic contexts that provide the conditions within which character develops, such 
approaches are unlikely to get to the heart of the complex problems that require of 
children and young people to be resilient, responsible and respectful of others. A more 
dynamic definition of ‘character’ is also needed that views character as an individual- in-
relation, formed through interpersonal relationships and engaged in the larger world 
(Sennett, 2003; Honneth, 1995, 2006). The danger arising from the increasingly 
precarious socio-economic conditions is that patterns of human activity in the school, the 
workplace and the public realm may become dominated by the calculative, instrumental 
treatment of others and ‘rampant self-assertion’ (Honneth, 2012, p. 18).  
This paper has, therefore, argued for the ‘priority of recognition’, as developed by 
Honneth (1995, 2006) and applied to the analysis of the current approaches to ‘producing’ 
character in schools. On Honneth’s account, character education needs to be seen within 
the broader social context, as a manifestation of recognition or its ‘opposite’, disrespect. 
Rather than teaching about the desirable character traits, character education needs to pay 
more attention to interpersonal relations, for it is these relations that provide the context 
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in which character is shaped. Contrary to the message conveyed through the industrial 
image of schools ‘producing’ the finished package, pupils displaying the ‘three Rs’ of 
resilience, respect and responsibility, character develops both within and beyond the 
classroom walls, as well as beyond the school years. As long as character education 
prioritises improving individual character without improving society, promoting 
resilience and other desirable character traits will be limited to trying to ameliorate some 
of the most severe consequences of social policy in the ‘cold climate’ of austerity (Lupton 
et al., 2016).  On the intersubjective view of identity offered by Honneth (1995, 2006), 
however, it is an improvement in social relations, in the classroom and beyond, that 
creates conditions allowing good character to develop. As social relations in these 
contexts appear to be increasingly infused with ‘cold, calculating purposefulness’, 
remembering the ‘priority of recognition’ is an important task for all those involved in 
character education.  
 
Notes 
1. To maintain the anonymity of the schools and Ofsted inspectors referred to in the 
extracts from Ofsted Reports cited in this paper, I have refrained from providing links to 
the reports on the Ofsted website.  
2. There is no scope in this paper for a detailed review of these theorists. It is, however, 
important to note their limited engagement with the complexities of socio-political and 
economic contexts within which character develops. For example, Goleman’s (1998, p. 
5) Emotional Intelligence model was first developed from research on factors 
determining ‘outstanding’ work performance in corporate environments. Seligman et 
al.’s (2009, p. 294) model of ‘positive education’ counters arguments of those who 
‘believe that well-being comes from the environment’ by presenting the following 
‘paradox’: ‘Almost everything is better now than it was 50 years ago: there is about 
three times more actual purchasing power, dwellings are much bigger, there are many 
more cars, and clothes are more attractive… there is more education, more music, and 
more women’s rights, less racism, less pollution, fewer tyrants, more entertainment, 
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more books, and fewer soldiers dying on the battlefield… Everything is better, that is, 
everything except human morale.’  
3. Honneth’s later work on educational implications of Hegel’ theory of ‘ethical life’ 
(Honneth, 2010) has been criticised for a one-sided, ‘positive’ interpretation of 
Hegelian dialectics (Hanhela, 2014a). 
4. ‘Fundamental British values’ include: democracy; the rule of law; individual liberty; 
and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs. They were 
introduced in 2011 in the UK government anti-terrorism ‘Prevent’ strategy (DfE, 
2014b). In line with the objectives of ‘Prevent’, all schools in England have a duty to 
‘actively promote’ these values.  
5. A table summarising forms of recognition and disrespect and their corresponding 
dimensions of personality can be found in Honneth (1995, p. 129).  
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